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CASE NOTES
analogy to be drawn between the present situation and that of a child con-
ceived in a bigamous marriage. In this instance the Illinois legislature en-
acted a statute making the child legitimate.3 6 So long as the Illinois legislature
refuses to take any action regarding the legal status of artificial insemination,
no reason can be seen for not enacting a statute, as in Georgia,3 7 legitimizing
the children so conceived in an effort to protect these innocents.
Walter Birk
3 6 
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 89, § 17(a) (1967).
37 Supra note 32.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-DEFENDANT'S
RIGHTS DURING EXTRA-JUDICIAL
IDENTIFICATION DEFINED
Ernest Crume was arrested by the Houston, Texas police for drunkenness
on December 14, 1956. Later the police questioned him concerning a robbery
which had occurred four days earlier, and in pursuit of their suspicions, had
him appear in several lineups. As a result of one of these lineups and an
individual confrontation, he was identified by the victim of the robbery and
subsequently convicted. During the lineup in which the identification was
made, the officers singled the defendant out from the other participants,
forced him to wear a hat and to repeat the words, "This is a stickup." In the
later confrontation, which occurred in a private office, he was asked to wear a
jacket which matched the description of that worn by the robber and to
walk alone past the witness, again repeating the words he had spoken in the
lineup. In both instances, the individual attention focused on the defendant
was not police-instigated, but was arranged at the request of the witness in
order that she might be as certain as possible before making a positive identi-
fication. In a federal habeas corpus proceeding, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas denied the defendant relief. In af-
firming that decision, the United States Courts of Appeals addressed itself
primarily to Crume's contention that the police, by exerting a suggestive in-
fluence on the witness, had rendered the means of identification so unfair as to
be in violation of his right to due process. Crume v. Beto, 383 F.2d 36 (5th
Cir. 1967).'
1 Circuit Judge Rives specially concurred in the result only, on the grounds that the
prisoner had not exhausted his state remedies as to the question of due process and that
the question was not properly before the court since it had not been considered or decided
by the Federal District Court. Crume v. Beto, 383 F.2d 36, 41 (5th Cir. 1967).
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The Crume case's clearest claim to distinction lies in the fact that it deals
with the question of pre-trial identifications in terms of due process require-
ments. In writing the opinion of the Supreme Court in Rockin v. California,
Justice Frankfurter observed, "Due Process of law as a historic and genera-
tive principle, precludes defining, and thereby confining these standards of
conduct more precisely than to say that convictions cannot be brought about
by methods that offend a 'sense of justice.' ,2 In recent years, this generative
quality of due process has been manifest. The judicial conception of those
immunities, that "are so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people
as to be ranked as fundamental,"'3 has been expanded to other areas of
criminal procedure and to other factual situations devoid of the brutality in-
volved in Rochin. The Supreme Court has declared that deprivation of human
liberty is essentially a decision for the judiciary. Therefore, absent a judicial
warrant or probable cause, there cannot be a lawful arrest. 4 Further the Court
has stated that the right to be confronted by an accuser and to be allowed
effectively to cross-examine him is fundamental. In Gideon v. Wainwright
the Court held that indigent defendants have a right to counsel in at least all
felony prosecutions. 6 In Escobedo v. Illinois7 it was held that an accused has
a right to consult a lawyer during interrogation, and in Miranda v. Arizona8
the Court warned that the accused must be advised of his rights. The most
recent extensions of the right to counsel were announced in United States v.
Wade9 and Gilbert v. California'° wherein the court declared that a suspect
has the right to counsel at an identification lineup.
Frankfurter's reference to due process as a "generative principle" proves
apt as applied to these cases, but his advice against "defining and thereby
confining"" the bounds of due process has not been followed. The court was
quite explicit, for instance, in the Miranda12 decision, in its explanation of
,2 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952).
3 Id. at 169.
4 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332 (1943).
5 Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
6 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
7 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
8 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
9388 U.S. 218 (1967).
10388 U.S. 263 (1967).
11 Rochin v. California, supra note 2, at 173.
12 The court held that a suspect must be warned of his right to remain silent and that
anything he says may be used as evidence against him. He must also be advised that he
has the right to the assistance of a lawyer and that if he cannot afford it, one will be ap-
pointed. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 346 (1966).
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exactly what must be done to insure that a suspect is not deprived of due
process. The Crume case might possibly mark an intermediate stage in the
evolutionary development of due process as it applies to extra-judicial identi-
fications. It is at once a clarification of what is now required, and an indication
of future developments.
An appreciation of the present trend would be facilitated by a general look
at what has been the law in most jurisdictions regarding extra-judicial identi-
fications. The majority of courts dealing with the problem have held that
questions as to the means whereby a particular identification has been made
should be treated as relating merely to the weight and sufficiency of the evi-
dence and not to its admissibility. 13 The situation in People v. Hicks14 serves
to demonstrate the practical results of this holding. The police told the witness
that they had caught the burglar and that his name was Hicks. During the
subsequent lineup, Hicks was asked to state his name. The court declared
that means used in gaining the identification did not render the testimony of
that identification incompetent and that it went to the weight and sufficiency
of the evidence rather than to its admissibility. In United States v. John-
son,15 defendant questioned the method of his identification since it took
place as he stood alone before the witness rather than in a lineup. In answer
to this question, the court expressed what has been the holding of most courts:
"We know of no case, constitutional provision or statute which requires a
lineup for identification of suspects. ... "16 Thus, regardless of the procedure
used to secure the identification, the decision as to its validity is left to the
jury who are often unduly receptive to evidence of identification.' 7 "The only
type of evidence more damning than personal identification is a confession."' 8
Consideration of the damning nature of eyewitness identifications in con-
junction with the proven unreliability of such identifications in the past 19
13 People v. Branch, 127 Cal. App. 2d 438, 274 P.2d 31 (1954) ; People v. Parham, 60
Cal. 2d 378, 384 P.2d 1001, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 945 (1964), rehearing denied, 379 U.S.
873 (1964) ; People v. Boney, 28 Ill. 2d 505, 192 N.E.2d 920 (1963) ; People v. Hicks, 22
Ill. 2d 364, 176 N.E.2d 810 (1961); Redmon v. Commonwealth, 321 S.W.2d 397
(Ky. 1959). But see People v. Cotton, 117 Cal. App. 469 (1931) ; Johnson v. State, 44
Okla. Crim. 113, 279 P. 933 (1929) ; People v. Conley, 275 App. Div. 743, 87 N.Y.2d 745
(1949).
14 People v. Hicks, supra note 13.
15 United States v. Johnson, 362 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1966).
16Id. at 47.
17 Comment, Due Process In Extra-Judicial Identifications, 24 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
107, 108 (1967).
18 Comment, Possible Procedural Safeguards Against Mistaken Identification By
Eyewitnesses, 2 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 552, 556 (1955).
19BoRcHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT xii (1932); Williams and Hammelmann,
Identification Parades, 1963 CRm. L. REv. 479; 2 U.C.L.A. L. REV., supra note 18.
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must, upon reflection, lead to serious doubts concerning the validity of any
conviction based upon such evidence. "It is impossible to estimate the number
of persons wrongly convicted whose innocence is never established.
20
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, -in deciding the case of Palmer v.
Peyton,21 acknowledged the existence of the problem and, by its decision,
paved the way for future due process attacks on unfair identifications. The
witness involved here was the victim of a rape, and the identification was
made of the defendant's voice. Before hearing the suspect's voice, the witness
was told that the police had a Negro suspect in custody, and had been shown
the suspect's shirt, which was similar to that worn by her assailant. The
witness was permitted to hear only Palmer's voice which she identified as that
of her attacker, even though that assailant had worn a hood over his head
which must have muffled his voice. "The opportunity for suggestion inherent
in the procedure used to secure this identification is manifest." 22 The signifi-
cance of the case lies in the holding that the procedure used to identify de-
fendant had deprived him of due process. "A state may not rely . . . upon
evidence secured by a process in which the search for truth is made secon-
dary to the quest for a conviction. ' 23 This case parallels Rochin24 in that the
procedure used was held so unfair as to offend a sense of justice, yet, as in
Rochin, no particular standard was offered to define due process.
In the Wade25 and Gilbert26 decisions the Supreme Court addressed itself
directly to the problem. In the Wade opinion, which was documented exten-
sively by outside sources, the Court focused its attention upon the inherent
dangers of identification confrontations in a lineup or otherwise. Quoting with
approval, the Court observed that "the influence of improper suggestion upon
identifying witnesses probably accounts for more miscarriage of justice than
any other single factor-perhaps it is responsible for more such errors than all
other factors combined." 27Numerous examples of police suggestion were re-
counted. Ultimately, the Court held that the identification is a critical stage
of the prosecution and the right to counsel was extended to those in lineups.
"In short, the accused's inability effectively to reconstruct at trial any un-
fairness that occurred at the lineup may deprive him of his only opportunity
20 2 U.C.L.A. L. REv. supra note 18, at 553.
21 Palmer v. Peyton, 359 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1966).
22 Id. at 201.
2 8 Id. at 202.
24 Supra note 2.
2 5 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
26 Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
=
7 Supra note 25, at 229.
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meaningfully to attack the credibility of the witness' courtroom identifica-
tion.128
Stovall v. Denno,29 decided the same day as Wade and Gilbert, declared
that the rules announced in those cases would be applied prospectively only.
Thus after June 12, 1967, all participants in confrontations conducted for
identification purposes have a right to the advice of counsel; but those con-
victed on evidence gained through identifications before that date may not
attack their convictions on the ground that they were denied the aid of coun-
sel. More pertinent to the instant case is the fact that, in Stovall, the Supreme
Court recognized the due process clause as a legitimate means of attack on the
method of identification, independent of the sixth amendment right to counsel.
The confrontation in Stovall occurred in the hospital room of the witness who
had been stabbed after witnessing the murder of her husband. The identifica-
tion was made as the suspect, a Negro, stood flanked by five white police
officers. Referring in the Wade opinion to these circumstances, the court
observed that, "It is hard to imagine a situation more clearly conveying the
suggestion to the witness that the one presented is believed guilty by the
police." 3° Despite this, the court held that petitioner had not been deprived
of due process. The question of whether a particular identification has been
made in violation of due process depends on, "the totality of circumstances
surrounding it." Here, due to the critical condition of the witness and the fact
that she was the only witness to the crime, "an immediate hospital confronta-
tion was imperative."'
In the Crume case the court cited the holding in Stovall as to prospective
application of the Wade and Gilbert rules in answer to petitioner's content-
tion that the absence of counsel had deprived him of due process. Then, follow-
ing the lead of Peyton v. Palmer'2 and Stovall, the court acknowledged the
fact that the danger of suggestion may be so great in a particular identifica-
tion as to deprive the suspect of due process of law. Applying the Stovall
"totality of circumstances" test, the court dealt separately with the occasions
on which the petitioner was singled out. As to the occurrences in the lineup
itself, much significance was attached to the fact that the witness herself
instigated the individual attention focused on the defendant, indicating that
she "thought she recognized Crume as the robber but ... could not be sure
unless she could see him wearing a hat."'83 The court felt that the danger of
28Supra note 25, at 231-233.
29 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
S0 Supra note 25, at 234.
81 Supra note 29, at 302.
3 2 Supra note 21.
83 Supra note 1, at 37.
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suggesting a suspect to the witness was diminished because she had already
settled firmly on one of them. "Nonetheless when the witness' original identi-
fication is as strong as it was here, we.think the danger of suggestion so small
as not to violate due process."3.4 As to the later confrontation in a detective's
office, the court thought it ". . . the most difficult question we find in this
case. '" 5 Well aware of the possibility of injustice in such a situation, the court
quotes from the Peyton opinion that "there is ... a strong predisposition to
overcome doubts and to fasten guilt upon the lone suspect. 816 Yet it was held
that in this case "the circumstances indicate that this irregularity did not
have the proscribed suggestive effect on the witness." 3
In assessing the importance of the Crume case as an extension of the Peyton
and Stovall decisions, the dicta used is too significant to be overlooked. The
court regarded this as "an exceptionally close case."'38 "We have no doubt
that there would have been a denial of due process had the police initiated
these procedures without any prior indication from [the witness] that Crume
was the bandit. ' 39 Suggesting that all the participants in a lineup should say
the same words or try on the same hat, even when the witness has indicated an
interest in a particular suspect the court hints that, "When the witness'
original identification is tentative or is for some other reason suspect, such a
procedure could easily rise to the dignity of a due process requirement. 4 0
Such statements appear to be strong language upon consideration of the
traditional "weight of the evidence" rule which admitted evidence of an
identification secured by any method.
By its dicta, the court has given further definition to the requirements
guaranteed by the due process clause. Thus it may be said that any singling
out of a particular suspect in a lineup is a violation of due process unless the
witness has requested it or there is some other reason to believe that the
danger of suggestion is minimal. Similarly, any identification of the suspect
without the protection afforded by comparison with other persons of similar
appearance may or may not be a violation of due process, depending on the
circumstances. If the confrontation is conducted due to the critical condition of
the witness or is imperative for some other reason, or if the witness is already
fairly certain of the suspect's identity, there will be no deprivation of
due process.
34 Supra note 1, at 40.
35 Id.
36 Supra note 1, at 39.
3 7 Supra note 1, at 41.
38 Id.
39 Supra note 1, at 40.
40 Id.
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In consideration of the recent concern with the reliability of the guilt de-
termining process, 41 the dicta of this case bears obvious importance for those
convicted by evidence of an identification, but unable to benefit by the deci-
sions of the Wade and Gilbert cases. By several times mentioning the close-
ness of the decision and the difficulty with which it was made, the Crume
court may be deemed to have implied that an identification secured as a
result of police suggestion would be in violation-of due process without some
mitigating circumstances. Hence cases where such evidence was admitted
might be subject to reversal on the basis of "due process" without regard to
the sixth amendment "right to counsel." By quoting with approval the Su-
preme Court statement that, "The practice of showing suspects singly to
persons for the purpose of identification and not as part of a lineup has been
widely condemned," the court left the inference that any such identification
might well have been a violation of due process, absent some qualifying
circumstances.
But the further delineation of those rights that are fundamental raises
another question. Should not the same standards be applied to cases after
June 12, 1967? Does the presence of a lawyer guarantee that a suspect will
not be the victim of police suggestion? Certainly not every lawyer is equally
skilled at ferreting out the suggestive influence of police officers before or
during the lineup, nor is every lawyer as proficient in relating such abuses to
the jury who are "often unduly receptive to evidence of identification.1 42
Are "principles of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental" to depend upon one's choice of a
lawyer? If the right to be identified by a procedure devoid of intentional or
unintentional police suggestion is indeed fundamental and separate from the
right to counsel, it should not hinge upon the ability of one's lawyer to detect
abuses and present them to the jury as part of the evidence. Rather the abuses
themselves should be abolished. The recognition of such practices as violative
of due process in themselves, apart from the right to the assistance of counsel,
may ultimately lead to standardization of the means of identification to be
used. As the Supreme Court suggested in the Wade decision, "Legislative or
other regulations, such as those of local police departments, which eliminate
the risks of abuse and unintentional suggestion at lineup proceedings and the
impediments to meaningful confrontation at trial may also remove the basis
for regarding the stage as critical."'48 If not a critical stage, there would be no
need for counsel. Crume v. Beto by further defining the once amorphous
structure of due process may be likened to a small chisel mark on a large
41 See Mishkin, The Supreme Court 1964 Term, 79 HARv. L. REv. 56, 77-92 (1965).
42 Supra note 17, at 108.
43Supra note 25, at 239.
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marble stone, perhaps not making a noticeable difference in the immediate
appearance of the due process structure, but no less essential to the emerging
form than the larger areas chiseled out by such cases as Escobedo44 and
Wade.
45
Terrance Norton
44 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
45 Supra note 25.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EXCEPTIONS TO THE PROHIBITION
AGAINST CONSIDERING MOOT QUESTIONS
Eviction proceedings under the Georgia Code were instituted against peti-
tioners, two indigent Negroes living in low rental apartments. Under the
Georgia Code a defendant is required to post a security bond as a condition
precedent to any offer of defense in such an action.1 Yet, because of their
indigency, defendants were unable to post the bond. The Superior Court of
Fulton County denied a petition for an injunction staying the dispossessory
proceedings and the Supreme Court of Georgia dismissed the complaint for
declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the statute as moot because
the sheriff of Fulton County had already evicted the tenants in the interim.
The Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari, Justices Douglas,
Warren and Brennan dissenting. Williams v. Shaffer, 385 U.S. 1037 (1967).
In its dismissal of the complaint, the Georgia Supreme Court stated:
Where, as here, the petition shows that the rights of the parties have already ac-
crued and no facts or circumstances are alleged which show that an adjudication
of the plaintiffs' rights is necessary in order to relieve the plaintiffs from the risk
of taking any future undirected action incident to their rights, which action
without direction would jeopardise their interests, the petition fails to state a
cause of action for declaratory judgment.2
The petition was dismissed because the Georgia court was of the opinion
that there were no longer rights in question subject to adjudication; the
denial of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court was based on the
same premise. Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion, glossed over any
legal rebuttal to this argument, stating only that, "The finding of mootness
1 GA. CODE ANw. § 61-303 (1966): "The tenant may arrest the proceedings and
prevent the removal of himself and his goods . . . .Provided, such tenant shall at the
same time tender a bond with good security, payable to the landlord, for the payment
of such sum, with costs, as may be recovered against him on the trial of the case."
2 Williams v. Shaffer, 222 Ga. 334, 149 S.E.2d 668 (1966).
